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INTRODUCTION

Patents are typically justified as a means to provide critical incentives for
technical progress, and as a vehicle to offer a crucial gateway to recognition and
remuneration when commercializing new technologies.1 The exclusive rights
conveyed by a patent are said to offset the effortless appropriability of the
patented technology, safeguarding the financial return on investments in
technical innovation. The public is said to trade 20 years of exclusivity in return
for the development and disclosure of beneficial discoveries. In order to
ameliorate the restrictive effects of such exclusivity, patents are reserved for
significant new advances, which then pass into the public domain for general use
once the exclusive incentive period ends.
The efficacy of patents in achieving these ends is sometimes questioned.2 But
one failure of patenting that is clearly not in question is the underrepresentation
of women in every aspect of the patent system, and their sparse participation in
whatever benefits patents in fact confer.3 The empirical evidence of a manifest
gender disparity in patenting is overwhelming. Relatively few patents include
women as named inventors.4 Women constitute a very small minority of
registered patent attorneys.5 Women who have made a discovery or scientific
advance are less likely than their male counterparts to consider patenting.6
Women’s applications for patents are more likely to be rejected by the United

See Dan L. Burk, Law and Economics of Intellectual Property: In Search of First Principles, 8 ANN.
REV. L & SOC. SCI. 397, 407 (2012).
2 Mark A. Lemley, Faith-Based Intellectual Property, 62 UCLA L. REV. 1328, 1331 (2015); JAMES
BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS AND
LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK, 164 (2008).
3 See generally Holly Fechner & Matthew S. Shapanka, Closing Diversity Gaps in Innovation: Gender,
Race, and Income Disparities in Patenting and Commercialization of Inventions, 19 TECH. &
INNOVATION 727, 727-29 (2018) (summarizing studies on the patent gender gap).
4 OFF. OF THE CHIEF ECON., U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., PROGRESS AND POTENTIAL 2020
UPDATE ON U.S. WOMEN INVENTOR-PATENTEES 4, at 3–4 (July 2020), https://
www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/OCE-DH-Progress-Potential-2020.pdf;
OFF. OF THE CHIEF ECON., U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., PROGRESS AND POTENTIAL: A
PROFILE OF WOMEN INVENTORS ON U.S. PATENTS 2, at 3–5 (Feb. 2019), https://
www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Progress-and-Potential-2019.pdf; Gema Lax
Martinez et al., Identifying the Gender of PCT Inventors 2 (World Intell. Prop. Org., Economic
Research Working Paper No. 33, 2016), https://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/
wipo_pub_econstat_wp_33.pdf.
5 Saurabh Vishnubhakat, Gender Diversity in the Patent Bar, 14 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP.
L. 67, 80–82 (2014).
6 Francesco Lissoni et al., Inventorship and Authorship as Attribution Rights: An Enquiry into the
Economics of Scientific Credit, 95 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 49, 51–52 (2013); Kjersten Bunker
Whittington & Laurel Smith-Doerr, Women Inventors in Context: Disparities in Patenting Across
Academia and Industry, 22 GENDER & SOC’Y 194, 201–04 (2008); Waverly W. Ding et al., Gender
Differences in Patenting in the Academic Life Sciences, 313 SCI. 665, 665 (2006).
1
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States Patent Office.7 The deficit of patents in women’s hands is believed to
curtail their entrepreneurial or business opportunities.8
In the face of such compelling disparity, some have begun to respond.
Numerous empirical studies have documented different dimensions of the
patent gender gap, both domestically and internationally.9 Some institutional
reactions have also begun to appear. Both the United States Patent Office and
the World Intellectual Property Organization have taken note of the deficit in
female engagement with patents and have instituted programs either to educate
or to invite female participants.10 A small but growing scholarly literature had
called attention to the problem.11 Proposals have been made for procedural or
doctrinal adjustments to attract female participation in patenting.12
Such efforts, while commendable, are very late arrivals. When recounting the
history of action and ideas toward female social equality, we commonly speak of
the shifting focus of scholarship and activism in “waves” running from the
nineteenth century into the twenty-first. Naturally (and somewhat appropriately)
the trajectory of feminist reform is far messier and far less discrete than such
divisions would suggest. But if we are not too fastidious about pristine
demarcations, we might speak generally of a “first wave” of feminist sentiment,
devoted to establishing some basic social parity for women, such as the right to
vote, the right to hold property, the right to enter into contracts, and similar
formal recognition of female autonomy.13 A “second wave” of discourse and
action expanded and deepened these efforts, recognizing structural and implicit
gender biases in the majority of social institutions.14 A further “third wave” of

Kyle Jensen et al., Gender Differences in Obtaining and Maintaining Patent Rights, 36 NAT. BIOTECH.
307, 307–08 (2018).
8 Paula E. Stephan & Asmaa El-Ganainy, The Entrepreneurial Puzzle: Explaining the Gender Gap,
32 J. TECH. TRANSFER 475, 486 (2007); see also Dana Kanze et al., We Ask Men to Win and
Women Not to Lose: Closing the Gender Gap in Startup Funding, 61 ACAD. MGMT. J. 586 (2018)
(showing that patents are a capital need that female entrepreneurs are questioned about).
9 See, e.g., Cassidy R. Sugimoto et al., The Academic Advantage: Gender Disparities in Patenting,
10 PLOS ONE 2 (2015); Jennifer Hunt et al., Why Are Women Underrepresented Amongst Patentees?,
42 RES. POL’Y 831 (2013); Ranier Frietsch et al., Gender Specific Patterns in Patenting and Publishing,
38 RES. POL’Y 590 (2009); Fiona Murray & Leigh Graham, Buying Science and Selling Science:
Gender Differences in the Market for Commercial Science, 16 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 657 (2007).
10 See supra note 4 and sources cited therein.
11 Kara W. Swanson, Intellectual Property and Gender: Reflections on Accomplishments and Methodology,
24 AM. U.J. GENDER, SOC. POL’Y & L. 175, 175–77 (2015) (reviewing the development of legal
scholarship on intellectual property and gender).
12 Jessica Lai, Patents and Gender: A Contextual Analysis, 10 QUEEN MARY J. INTELL. PROP. 283,
283–85 (2020); Miriam Bitton-Marcowitz et al., Unregistered Patents & Gender Inequality, 43
HARV. J.L. & GENDER 47 (2020); Dan L. Burk, Diversity Levers, 23 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y
25 (2015).
13 See Leslie Bender, A Lawyer’s Primer on Feminist Theory and Tort, 38 J. LEGAL ED. 3, 12–13
(1988) (describing first wave feminism).
14 Id. at 13–14 (describing second wave feminism).
7
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activity re-envisioned feminist goals, emphasizing “intersectionality” or the
connections to broader themes of social justice for subordinated groups.15
During what we might consider the late second and early third waves of
feminist activity, most areas of law came under scrutiny16, initially for explicit
bias against women, and later, once many of the obvious explicit forms of
discrimination had been ostensibly eliminated, for implicit bias against women.17
Criminal law, family law, employment law, bankruptcy, corporate law, and
numerous other areas were examined.18 That process remains ongoing today. But
as I and other commentators have observed, such scrutiny somehow passed
intellectual property law by.19 In particular, patent law until recently escaped any
serious consideration of gendering, misogyny, and related bias.20
Consequently, we might regard recent initiatives to include more women
within the patent system to constitute largely first wave propositions or at best
very early second wave propositions. Examples of these propositions include
preliminary, basic, and fundamental efforts to secure equal participation and
recognition for women as inventors, patent agents, and patent administrators.
Although the patent system entails no explicit prohibitions on female
participation, and there at present is no explicit social stigma in female patenting,
we are only now beginning to lay the foundation that would allow gender parity
in the patent system. And, given past experience in laying and building on such
foundations, we might expect that, as has proved to be the case in every other
area of law, equal participation will be a contested and contestable metric, and
meaningful female participation will be stymied by a complex network of
underlying social impediments.
Some scrutiny of patents beyond fundamental, first wave propositions is
therefore needed. Without accessing the frameworks provided in other areas by
second- and third-wave feminist scholars, efforts toward gender equity in patent
law, like past efforts in other areas, are likely to founder on unseen obstructions
in the institutional structures being reformed. Patent law may be well behind in
correcting its biases, but tardiness offers the opportunity to learn from what has
been done elsewhere. In particular, to paraphrase Judith Butler, before
embarking on reform of the patent gender gap, we ought to consider the futility
of a remedial program that seeks to radically transform the innovation situation

See Bridget J. Crawford, Toward a Third-Wave Feminist Legal Theory: Young Women, Pornography
and the Praxis of Pleasure, 14 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 99, 108–11 (2007).
16 See Dan L. Burk, Copyright and Feminism in Digital Media, 14 AM. U. J. GENDER, SOC. POL’Y &
L. 519, 520 (2006) (describing how intellectual property was overlooked in successive waves
of feminist legal scrutiny).
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 Kara W. Swanson, Intellectual Property and Gender: Reflections on Accomplishments and Methodology,
24 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 175, 179 (2015).
20 Id.
15
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of women without first considering whether innovation is socially constructed in
such a way that women are, by definition, handicapped in innovating.21
The purpose of this essay is therefore largely remedial. My thesis here is that
patents are performative, in the sense that they enact what they disclose, in the sense
that they create their own social facts. In order to demonstrate this, I trace the
development of performativity theories, from their Austinian beginnings to their
application as a general theory of action in the social world22, showing how each
perspective illuminates the nature and function of the patent system.23 I then
illustrate what it means to perform patenting, to perform invention, and to
perform innovation within the constraints of our present system, suggesting how
patenting is structured to continually recreate its own fundamental assumptions.
Recognizing the patent system’s performative character in turn suggests that
closing the gender gap will not be a simple matter of encouraging more female
scientists and engineers to think about patenting. Finally, I close with some
thoughts as to how this understanding might guide and temper future efforts to
address the patent gender gap.
II. PERFORMATIVITY THREE WAYS
The concept of performativity has evolved over time; in fact, it may be
legitimately said that the term now encompasses at least three different meanings
or usages. The initial concept labeled as performativity originated with John
Austin’s influential How To Do Things With Words, in which he proposed a
framework for considering expression as social action.24 Austin’s insights were
later expanded and re-oriented by Judith Butler into an equally influential
framework for considering the formation of identity in a broader social context.25
Finally, these analyses provided the foundation for general sociological
application of their principles to understand the fabrication of social reality.26
Here, I briefly sketch the major features and implications of each of these
approaches, and their intersections with one another, as background to
examining how patents behave within each of their frameworks.

21 See Judith Butler, Performative Acts and Gender Constitution: An Essay in Phenomenology and Feminist

Theory, 40 THEATRE J. 519, 523 (1988).
See J.L. AUSTIN, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS, Lecture XI, at 134 (1975); Nicolas
Brisset, The Future of Performativity, 7 ŒCONOMIA 439, 443 (2017).
23 With apologies to Ed Kitch, with whom this exposition will be almost entirely at odds. See
Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265 (1977).
24 AUSTIN, supra note 22.
25 See generally Irene Rafanell, Durkheim and the Performative Model: Reconfiguring Social Objectivity,
in SOCIOLOGICAL OBJECTS: THE RECONFIGURATION OF SOCIAL THEORY 59, 62–66 (Geoff
Cooper, Andrew King & Ruth Rettie eds., 2009) (tracing the development of performativity
from Austin to Butler to Barnes).
26 Id.
22
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A. AUSTINIAN PERFORMATIVITY

Austin was interested in defining and exploring qualities of language, and in
particular in understanding classes of expression that he termed “speech acts,”
which are not so much communicative or descriptive as they are operative. His
work divides expression into constative and performative categories; the former
comprises statements about the world, such as “the United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit principally sits in a federal courthouse in
Washington, D.C.” These can be judged as true or false. In contrast,
performative statements such as a federal judge announcing, “The defendant is
found liable for patent infringement,” may be said to intervene in the world,
changing it from one state to another. Because of their operational nature,
performative utterances are neither true nor false, but are rather effective or
ineffective–in Austin’s terminology, felicitous or infelicitous.27 Performatives
affect what they express, for example changing the status of a defendant to that
of infringer, with all the attendant implications of liability and blame. Thus, for
Austin, performative utterances do not simply mean what they say, but actually do
what they say.
Austin showed that in expressing or articulating language, we are engaged not
only in communicating content, but in social action. Communication is of course
itself a type of action, and arises from physical action, so speaking entails a set of
acts that Austin styled as locutionary, illocutionary, and perlocutionary. Thus,
when Sir Lancelot declares, “I dub thee Sir Galahad, knight of the Round Table,”
the physical act of utterance or expression (together with accompanying taps
with the flat of his blade on the subject’s shoulder) constitutes the locution. The
subject’s change in social status from squire to knight constitutes the
illocutionary act, and the results of that change–being referred to as “Sir,” sitting
in the Siege Perilous, wearing gold spurs–constitute the perlocutionary acts from
the utterance. Illocutionary effects are said to be constitutive, to constitute the
condition expressed, whereas perlocutionary effects are said to be causal, a
follow-on result of the illocution.
Austin’s work was subsequently amplified and interpreted by John Searle,
who divided illocutionary expression into five categories, depending on the
nature of their illocutionary effects: representatives, expressives, directives,
commissives, and declarations.28 The first four of these, respectively, make
assertions about the world, indicate the speakers’ thoughts or attitudes, direct
action by others, or commit the speaker to a course of action. Of particular
interest to this discussion is the final category, which are the category in which
illocutionary performatives are to be found–declarative statements that change
the state of the world according to their content.29
AUSTIN, supra note 22, at 14.
John R. Searle, A Classification of Illocutionary Acts, 5 LANG. SOC’Y 1 (1976).
29 John R. Searle, How Performatives Work, 12 LINGUISTICS & PHIL. 535, 552–53 (1989).
27
28
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Austin’s framework has particular resonance in law, where performative
utterances abound,30 from contractual performatives such as “I promise to sell
you broiler chickens at one dollar a piece”31 to “I convey a life estate in Blackacre
to my daughter” to the judicial declaration that a bulldozer is a “building,”32 to
any number of statutory or regulatory declarations.33 Each of these statements,
uttered under the proper conditions, serves to alter the legal (and hence social)
state of the world.34 Note that some such statements sit in more than one
category simultaneously, such as the contractual offer to sell that is both a
commissive statement and declarative statement: the contractual offer to sell
both commits the speaker to a particular course of action while simultaneously
changing the status and responsibilities of the speaker and the intended
recipient.35
It should also be immediately clear that for any of these expressions to change
the state of the world, they must be spoken by the proper person under the
proper conditions. For utterances to acquire illocutionary force, they must be
promulgated under what Austin terms felicitous conditions; pronouncing
Galahad a knight has no effect unless the utterance comes from one recognized
as having the authority to confer that social status. Also, the recipient of
knighthood must usually be drawn from a certain social class, must have access
to a horse and weapons, must have completed training as an esquire, and so on.
Similarly, an estate in Blackacre is not conveyed unless expressed via recognized
processes; depending on the jurisdiction this may require witnesses, or
recordation, or other formalities. Pronouncements that fail the necessary felicity
conditions are ineffective, or as Austin would put it, infelicitous.36
The contribution of necessary felicity conditions to the operation of
illocutionary acts means that such utterances are dependent upon recognized,
existing social structures for their performative force.37 Thus, illocutionary force
See Charles Bazerman, Performatives Constituting Value: The Case of Patents, in THE
CONSTRUCTION OF PROFESSIONAL DISCOURSE 42, 44 (Britt-Louise Gunnarsson, Per Linnell
& Bengt Norberg eds., 1997) (cataloging performative utterances in law).
31 Cf. Frigaliment Importing Co. Ltd. v. BNS Int’l Sales Corp., 190 F.Supp. 116 (S.D.N.Y.
1960) (determining the intended meaning of the term “chicken” in a commercial contract).
32 See Commonwealth v. Plowman, 86 S.W.3d 47 (Ky. 2002) (holding that a bulldozer is a
“building” for purposes of the Kentucky arson statute).
33 See Lawrence Solum, Communicative Content and Legal Content, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 479,
485 (2013) (discussing various legal utterances as Austinian speech acts).
34 See Julie Stone Peters, Legal Performance Good and Bad, 4 L. CULT. & HUMANITIES 179, 185
(2008).
35 Nicholas Greenwood Onuf, Expressive Speech: Response to Renee Marlin-Bennett, in THE ART OF
WORLD-MAKING: NICHOLAS GREENWOOD ONUF AND HIS CRITICS 157, 158 (Henry D.
Gould ed., 2017).
36 AUSTIN, supra note 22, at 42.
37 Ekaterina Svetlova, Performativity and Emergence of Institutions, in ENACTING DISMAL SCIENCE:
NEW PERSPECTIVES ON THE PERFORMATIVITY OF ECONOMICS 183, 190 (Ivan Boldyrev &
Ekaterina Svetlova eds., 2016).
30
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depends not upon the form of the utterance of expression so much as upon that
form’s embeddedness in existing institutions.38 The illocutionary speech act
functions to invoke and coordinate associated social elements.39
We might also observe that illocutionary effects encompass those that are
necessary to the performance, and perlocutionary effects encompass those that
are contingent.40 Once Galahad is dubbed a knight, the enhanced regard given
to him by others in society is a necessary or constitutive effect; without
immediate social recognition of his status, he is not a knight. Seating at the Round
Table or wearing gold spurs are contingent effects; it may be possible to function
as a knight without these follow-on results. Similarly, in law, Blackacre is only
transferred if established convention necessarily recognizes the effect of its
bequest.41 That change may secondarily impact the tax assessment or postal
service associated with Blackacre, but such perlocutionary effects are not
essential to the performance of the bequest.42
B. BUTLERIAN PERFORMATIVITY

A second formulation of performativity comes from Judith Butler, whose
influential work moves the term out of the realm of linguistics or semiotics,
reorienting our understanding of Austin’s observations on social action. Butler
shows how social actors become the object or result of social action rather than
the subject or originators of social action.43 This framework explains not only
how meaning is made, but how identities are made. According to Butler, the
stylized and repeated language, gestures, signs, and meanings of social actors
come to constitute social reality.44 In particular, identity is constituted through
the constraints and expectations of sustained social performances.45 She
famously uses this approach to understand the nature of gender. Specifically, she
argues that reiterated and constrained performances of gender fabricate an
identity according to the norms that it both invokes and sustains.46
Butler draws explicitly on theatrical concepts to show how gender identity is
enacted.47 Much like the roles in a dramatic script, gender is only realized as it is
Sybille Krämer, Connecting Performance and Performativity: Does it Work?, in ENCOUNTERS IN
PERFORMANCE PHILOSOPHY 223, 223–24 (Laura Cull & Alice Lagaay eds., 2014).
39 Svetlova, supra note 37, at 190.
40 Brisset, supra note 22, at 441–42.
41 Id. at 442.
42 Id.
43 Butler, supra note 21, at 519; see also Candace West & Don H. Zimmerman, Doing Gender, 1
GENDER & SOC’Y 125, 129 (1987) (arguing that gender is constituted through social
interaction).
44 Butler, supra note 21, at 519.
45 Id. at 520.
46 Id.
47 Id. at 521.
38
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performed.48 The crux of Butler’s argument is that there is no prior or preexistent
identity over which gender is layered; rather, gender subsists in the process of its
own enactment.49 Rather than constituting a state that exists in the world prior
to its articulation, gender constitutes a performance that occurs in conjunction
with, and as part of, its articulation.50 Indeed, the core component of the
enactment of gender is the social fiction of interiority, which occurs as it is
performed.51 The expectation of gender itself becomes a reflexive determinant
of gender as it is adopted and repeated by its subjects.52
At the same time, Butler cautions that performativity cannot be reduced to
mere performance.53 In Butler’s framework, because there is no prior existing
identity to adopt the performative role, the identity must be fabricated out of the
repetition and re-inscription of the norms that constitute the performance.54
Thus, performativity is not enactment of a role in the sense that there is a prior
subject who assumes the persona, but rather is a role in the sense that enactment
only has meaning by virtue of references and citations to commonly shared
tropes, norms, and institutions.55 King Lear can only be understood to the extent
that an audience knows something of monarchy, aging, parenting, trust, and
betrayal.
Social performances of gender, therefore, become accepted and constitutive
of identity by means of acting out or staging particular behaviors that become
common expectations.56 Performative effects are not merely reinforced by
repeated performances, but are re-established with each performance.57
Performativity, therefore, “is a matter of reiterating or repeating the norms by
which one is constituted . . . .”58 Enactments are stabilized by their reference to
established social norms.
Butler’s formulation of performativity invokes convention, referencing and
relying on prior performances, while supporting and anticipating future felicitous
performances in a chain of normative practice.59 Social enactments, such as
gender, accumulate legitimacy and force through citation to prior authoritative
sets of practices.60 This is not to say that norms are determinative of identity in
Id. at 526-27.
Id. at 519, 528; see also West & Zimmerman, supra note 43, at 126 (arguing that gender is “an
emergent feature of social situations”).
50 Judith Butler, Performative Agency, 3 J. CULT. ECON. 147, 147 (2010).
51 Butler, supra note 21, at 528.
52 Id. at 524.
53 Judith Butler, Critically Queer, 1 GLQ: J. LESBIAN & GAY STUD. 17, 24 (1993).
54 Id. at 18, 21.
55 Id. at 23.
56 Svetlova, supra note 37, at 185, 193.
57 Butler, supra note 50, at 149.
58 Butler, supra note 53, at 22.
59 Id. at 17–18.
60 Id. at 19.
48
49
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and of themselves; every actor interprets Othello or Desdemona a little
differently. Rather, social performances are negotiated between the individual
and the constraints of normative citation.61
These insights lead us to engage with a more expansive understanding of
performativity that arose out of Austin’s initial work. Butler’s work moves
Austin’s conceptual framework from consideration of particular instances of
particular status changes toward a generalized understanding of social
performance and status. Butlerian performativity is ambient, ubiquitous, and
discursive. Unlike Austinian performativity, Butler’s conception of
performativity typically involves not one speaker, but multitudes. In Butler’s
work, performative utterances are not necessarily explicit declarations, but may
be implicit or distributed; social action is not the result of causal outcomes, but
the effect of reflexive feedback and conversations. Rather than arising from a
single or definite illocutionary act, Butler’s performativity arises from the
interaction at nodes of power and discourse.62
In this fashion, Butler’s amplification on performativity reveals a far more
complex network of social interplay in Austin’s work than the paradigm of stated
declaration and status change might suggest. Butler’s observations arise in part
from the necessary interplay between Austin’s illocutionary and perlocutionary
effects.63 Strictly speaking, Austin’s framework defines two modes for language
to affect the world: an illocutionary manner, that is constitutive of status, and a
perlocutionary manner, involving causality provoked by illocutionary force.64 But
the division between the two is never pristine; Galahad’s illocutionary change in
status upon his knighting is in large measure a function of the perlocutionary
activity of those around him, who now treat him differently.65
There is therefore a recursive relationship between the two types of effects.
It is clear that performative utterances have illocutionary force only to the degree
that they conform to existing normative expectations.66 Illocutionary
performances are immediate because they rely upon established norms and
relationships.67 Austin observes that illocutionary effects require felicity
conditions, but to be effective, such conditions must precede the illocutionary
utterance, so that the discursive relations that sustain an illocutionary

Id. at 18.
Id. at 17.
63 JUDITH BUTLER, EXCITABLE SPEECH 44 (1997).
64 See Brisset, supra note 22, at 441 (explaining constitutive and causal states modes of
language).
65 See id. (explaining the entanglement of constitutive and causal effects).
66 Jacques Derrida, Signature, Event, Context, in LIMITED INC 1, 18 (Gerald Graff ed., Samuel
Weber & Jeffrey Mehlman trans., 1988).
67 Michel Callon, Performativity, Misfires and Politics, 3 J. CULTURAL ECON. 163, 164 (2010);
Brisset, supra note 22, at 442.
61
62
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performance make possible the declaration that invokes it.68 The felicity
conditions for illocutionary performances are fully satisfied, which is why they
are effective.
Perlocutionary performances rely upon developing norms and relationships;
they may be said to constitute nascent or emerging illocution.69 Illocution
immediately changes ontological status; perlocution may eventually do so.70 Over
time, perlocutionary effects may become illocutionary effects–wearing gold spurs
or the honorific form of address, “Sir,” that follow from dubbing Galahad a
knight may themselves become performative statements.71 Illocutionary
performances are therefore to some extent the social endpoint of perlocution.
Perlocutionary effects may precess from contingent to necessary, becoming
accepted and conventional social facts over time.72 The difference between the
two may be largely a matter of interval, as perlocution becomes established and
evolves into illocution.73
Thus, in her emphasis on repetition and re-inscription of social norms, Butler
shows that there is no clean separation between illocution and perlocution; one
shades into the other. Butler also re-focuses our attention from Austinian
illocution to perlocution, showing that the power of performativity belongs
largely to the realm of perlocution rather than illocution.74 Unlike Austin’s
illocutionary performatives, Butler’s performative patterns do not result from
particular or singular utterances, but are instead the culmination or confluence
of more general social practices and relationships.75 Rather than an immediate
status change that is brought into being by a discrete declaration, Butler’s
performatives result from the shift in institutional conditions, often over time.76
In Austin’s framework, perlocution necessarily constitutes norms and beliefs,
and Butler shows that these fabricate identities by means of performance in the
dramaturgical sense, the reiteration of actions.77
C. BARNESIAN PERFORMATIVITY

Sociological analysis, particularly in the field of science and technology
studies, has taken Butler’s insights a step further. This analysis argues that
Butler supra note 50, at 148; Pierre Bourdieu, Authorized Language, in LANGUAGE AND
SYMBOLIC POWER 107, 111 (John B. Thompson ed., Gino Raymond & Matthew Adamson
trans., 1991).
69 Butler, supra note 50, at 151.
70 Callon, supra note 67, at 165.
71 Brisset, supra note 22, at 442.
72 Svetlova, supra note 37, at 192
73 Callon, supra note 67, at 164–65; Brisset, supra note 22, at 442.
74 Butler, supra note 50, at 153.
75 Id. at 151.
76 Id. at 151–52.
77 Svetlova, supra note 37, at 185.
68
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performativity is not only a mechanism leading to the construction of social
categories, but a mechanism of ontological nativity that functions to fabricate
social realities.78 Such conceptions of performativity seek to understand how
social facts come into existence.79 This version of performativity amplifies
Butler’s work to assert that meaning does not occur naturally, but is instead
constructed through a constellation of performances that engage with the world
to ontologically structure it in particular ways.80 Social discourse, rather than
describing objects, concomitantly enacts both subjects and objects.81 In
particular, performativity in this sense indicates that discourse constitutes the
objects or conditions of which it speaks.82 This strong form of performative
theory has sometimes been labeled “social institutional performativity”83 and
sometimes labeled “Barnesian performativity,” after a germinal paper in the
field.84
This approach foregrounds a reflexive quality of performativity not found in
Austin’s original formulation, but which is key to Butler’s framework, and
associates performative processes with an ontology of becoming.85 Performative
discourse is on this view not an articulation by which subjects speak about
objects, but is rather constitutive of both subjects and objects through a reflexive
process of recitation and repetition.86 As with Butler, such performativity is not
limited to particular speakers or particular declarations, but it looks broadly to
the enactment of discursive practices. Even within the initial Austinian
framework, constative or non-declarative statements clearly entail a type of
illocutionary force–descriptive speech is constitutive of a representation that will
have causal effects in the world.87 Ultimately, according to the Barnesian outlook,
such representations become constitutive of the world.
This version of performativity therefore entails an implicit division between
“natural” facts and socially fabricated facts, both of which define and constrain

Butler, supra note 50, at 147.
Svetlova, supra note 37, at 183.
80 Nicholas Blomley, Performing Property: Making the World, 26 CAN. J. L. & JURIS. 23, 33 (2013).
81 Luiza Bialasiewicz et al., Performing Security: The Imaginative Geographies of Current US Strategy,
76 POL. GEO. 405, 407 (2007).
82 Barry Barnes, Social Life as Bootstrapped Induction, 17 SOCIO. 524, 525 (1983); Bialasiewicz et
al., supra note 81, at 406; see also JUDITH BUTLER, BODIES THAT MATTER: ON THE DISCURSIVE
LIMITS OF SEX 2 (2d ed. 2011) (defining performativity as the “reiterative and citational practice
by which discourse produces the effects that it names.”).
83 See Rafanell, supra note 25, at 65.
84 Barnes, supra note 82.
85 See Lucas D. Introna, Epilogue: Performativity and the Becoming of Sociomaterial Assemblages, in
MATERIALITY AND SPACE: ORGANIZATIONS, ARTIFACTS AND PRACTICES 330, 335 (FrancoisXavier de Vaujany & Nathalie Mitev eds., 2013).
86 Bialasiewicz et al., supra note 81, at 406.
87 See Brisset, supra note 22, at 441.
78
79
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individual action.88 This is not a form of solipsism, or a denial of physical reality.
The world around us is real, but it is also made, and it is made by means of social
relations.89 Such socially constructed facts, although fabricated out of subjective
belief, become epistemically objective.90 They are made real by the agreement of
a large enough collection of individual beliefs.91 The dollar bill in my wallet holds
the value of one dollar, not because it is my opinion that it does, but because of
broad social recognition that it has that status.92
Despite this distinction, the Barnesian approach recognizes that social
facts—whether the value of money, the legitimacy of a wedding, or the job
description of a plumber—are a conglomerate of material practices, physical
structure, and behavioral consensus.93 To say that the federal government of the
United States is located in Washington, D.C., is to reference a cluster of social
facts, for example, that there is a political entity called the United States, that it
is governed by certain persons and institutions empowered to exercise authority
over that political entity, and that many or most of those persons and institutions
have their principal location at a geographic area designated as Washington, D.C.
Nothing in the nature of physical reality requires these facts to be facts; they
could all have been constituted differently. However, to say that the Capitol
building is located in Washington, D.C. references these agreed-upon social
structures, as well as the physical structure of a building that is physically located
at a particular geographic reference point. We may agree upon what to call the
Capitol, or upon what function it serves, but as a structure it is located in a
particular place regardless of agreement.
Given the focus of this discussion on patents, it is worth noting the deep
entanglement between social and natural facts. Indeed, it may be impossible to
find an example of a pure natural fact. We may say that a liter of water weighs
one kilogram, and this seems on its face like a natural or scientific fact. But the
choice of water as a reference, at a standard temperature and pressure commonly
experienced by humans on earth, reflect human convenience and experience. If
we were to choose benzene or mercury as our metric references, or a reference
temperature and pressure common to Venus, the metric would change. For just
this reason, the kilogram has been redefined in terms of universal constants such
as Planck’s constant and the speed of light, which are (perhaps) less entangled

See Barnes, supra note 82, at 525-26 (distinguishing speech acts based on natural or social
referants). See also Emile Durkheim, What is a Social Fact?, in THE RULES OF SOCIOLOGICAL
METHOD AND SELECTED TEXTS ON SOCIOLOGY AND ITS METHOD 50, 59 (Steven Lukes ed.,
W.D. Halls trans., 1982) (defining social facts).
89 John Law & John Urry, Enacting the Social, 33 ECON. & SOC’Y 390, 395–96 (2004).
90 JOHN R. SEARLE, THE CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY 189 (1995); Durkheim, supra note
88, at 59.
91 Law & Urry, supra note 89, at 395.
92 See SEARLE, supra note 90, at 190.
93 Law & Urry, supra note 89, at 395; Blomley, supra note 80, at 35.
88
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with social reference points.94 Of course, the origins of the measurement remain
socially entangled, even if the definition is now somewhat less so–the kilogram
unit, however defined, exists only because of particular social and cultural
histories.
Thus, the accumulation of social facts comprises social reality, not only as the
agreed upon facts derived from social behavior and beliefs, but as the lens
through which whatever we know of material reality is perceived.95 This brings
us to the operation of performative social action. The success of a performance
lies not so much in its correspondence or accuracy with regard to the world, but
in its adherence to felicity conditions, its capacity to enroll other attendant
resources, and its success in invoking and repeating past and future
performances.96 Performativity argues that subjects and objects are not simply
perceived or understood as social constructs, but rather emerge through their
mutual performances.97 This is not social constructivism in the sense that the
performative subject is a matter of perception, and in particular not simply the
product of whatever normative viewpoint or fashion seems ascendant. Rather,
following Butler’s argument, social facts become real in the world to the extent
that they successfully invoke, rely upon, and recapitulate other social
performances.98
III. HOW TO DO THINGS WITH PATENTS
With some background as to what performativity means, we are in a position
to now consider whether patents are performative within one or more of these
meanings. We shall see that patents participate in all three of the senses of
performativity we have sketched out above. But in order to do so, we must begin
by drawing another distinction, between the legal and policy purposes of patents,
and their social action as performatives. These functions are not unrelated, but
they are distinct, and we need to avoid muddling one with the other. In particular,
we need to avoid mistaking the intended policy purposes of patents for a type of
performative effect.
We have described performativity in several aspects, all of which have in
some manner to do with constituting social roles and social relationships.
Obviously, patents have an effect on social roles in a weak sense; that is, patents
create certain incentives that prompt (or we believe will prompt) certain types of
behaviors. That is of course their stated purpose; they are typically justified as
incentives to invest in new technology, or as bargains to disclose new technical
Associated Press, The Latest: Landmark Change to Kilogram Approved, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Nov.
16, 2018, https://apnews.com/e6991383703e4ad5a9570d97b0e57822.
95 See Law & Urry, supra note 89, at 395 (asserting that reality is a relational effect generated
from the interaction of the material and the social).
96 Blomley, supra note 80, at 42.
97 Id. at 36.
98 Id.
94
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information, so that their entire object is to induce certain actions to influence
the course of social behavior and to encourage certain policy outcomes.99 There
is some evidence that they may not be prompting the kind of behavior that we
want, or may not be prompting as much of that behavior as we would like, but
we frequently say that their purpose is to change behavior.100
We might of course say with some justification that such behavioral changes
are the purpose of all law, and patents are not unusual in that respect. So in one
sense, it seems almost trivial or frivolous to assert that patents make a difference
in the world or serve to enact realities.101 Neither are the incentives or behavioral
changes that may be prompted by patents trivial; indeed, they may well be
substantial, but they are also not performative in the sense I am discussing. If by
“performativity” we simply meant that patents have the behavioral effects they
were intended to have, there would be no reason to introduce a new and
somewhat gratuitous terminology into the patent discussion. On the contrary:
performativity in general, and patent performativity in particular, departs from
such incentives and behavioral prompts to the extent that it reflexively alters
identities, defines roles, restructures institutions, re-formulates legal and social
status.
I said at the outset that my argument here will be that patents create their own
social facts. Again, I intend this assertion to be taken in something more than a
trivial sense. To say that patents create social facts as Austinian performatives is
in one dimension quite clear, but not terribly interesting. Patents confer exclusive
rights in the claimed invention, and the patent term lasts for 20 years from the
date the application is filed. Those are social facts in the most trivial Austinian
sense; they are not truths drawn from the material structure of the universe, not
truths that exist independently of human culture, but like the value of a dollar
bill, are truths grounded in human agreement and recognition that we will live
according to that particular proposition.
In proposing patents as performatives, however, I am not simply pointing
out that patents have some behavioral effects, but am rather asserting the
proposition that the assumptions built into patent law and the patent system
become manifest and accepted as social truths. Such effects naturally result in
behavioral changes, but the behavioral changes are evidence of an underlying
fabrication of social reality. The responses to patent economic incentives that
occupy most patent scholarship are an aspect of patent performativity; the
behaviors enable patents while patents enable them. But in labeling patents as
performative, we are considering something quite distinct from their incentive

See Burk, supra note 1, at 404.
See Lemley, supra note 2, at 1334; Mark A. Lemley, The Surprising Resilience of the Patent System,
95 TEX. L. REV. 1, 2 (2016) (collecting empirical evidence that patents are not prompting
expected behavior).
101 See Law & Urry, supra note 89, at 393 (distinguishing social influence from social
enactment).
99

100
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effects, or from the generation of certain agreed upon institutional labels. It is
rather that patents are complicit in creating the social conditions that they assume.102
A. PATENT ILLOCUTION

The most obvious place to begin delineating patent performativity is to
situate their role within the Austinian framework of illocutionary action. Patents
lend themselves to this framework due to their textual and declarative nature.
Unlike other forms of intellectual property, which typically come into existence
through the use or creation of their subject matter, patents become operative
only with a statement by the inventor as to the scope and nature of its
exclusivity.103 Such statements are explicit in the patent document, in the form
of long (rather grammatically tortured) sentences beginning with the words “I
claim” followed by language delineating the technological scope of the claim.104
Several scholars outside the legal field have noted the operation of patents in
this sense of an illocutionary declaration, although few have developed their
analysis as to the implications of this observation.105 Patent performativity in this
Austinian sense should not surprise us; it is a common feature of legal language.
We have already observed that law is composed of authoritative documents and
utterances.106 Contracts, legislation, judicial opinions, executive orders, marriage
certificates, and myriad other legal documents and pronouncements operate to
change the state of the world. They generally do so by changing the status of
people or objects and the relationships among them. Patent claims surely do the
same, first by declaring the technology delineated by the claims to be subject to
exclusive legal rights, and second by declaring the technology within the claims
to include an invention or inventions that meet the statutory standards to be
called an invention.
But there is a good deal going on in such textual patent declarations besides
the stated illocutionary effects of the claims. Austin’s framework provides a
See Law & Urry, supra note 89, at 392–93 (arguing that performative investigations “help to
bring into being what they also discover”).
103 35 U.S.C § 112(b) (2012) (“The specification shall conclude with one or more claims
particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the inventor or a
joint inventor regards as the invention.”).
104 Id.
105 Fiorella Foscarini, The Patent Genre: Between Stability and Change, 87 ARCHIVARIA 36, 49 (2019);
Grant Leyton Simpson, The Social Textual Lives of Patents: The Phillips Screw and Driver, 11
TEXTUAL CULT. 172, 182 (2017); Carmen Sancho Guinda & Ismael Arinas Pellón, How Patent
Can Patents Be? Exploring the Impact of Figurative Language on the Engineering Patents Genre, in
METAPHOR AND METONYMY REVISITED BEYOND THE CONTEMPORARY THEORY OF
METAPHOR 183, 189 (Francisco Gonzálevez-Garcia et al. eds., 2013); CHARLES BAZERMAN,
THE LANGUAGES OF EDISON’S LIGHT (1999). Guinda and Pellón correctly observe that
patents entail multiple speech acts, including not only performative, but representative,
commissive, and other illocutionary texts.
106 See supra notes 30–35 and accompanying text.
102
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useful guide to tracing some of these additional implications. We know that for
the patent claims to have any performative effect, they must conform with the
felicity conditions necessary to affect a recognized and recognizable change in
status.107 It is well worth our while to begin identifying those felicity conditions.
To begin with, for an effective illocutionary patent performance, felicity
conditions include demonstrated conformity with the required statutory
characteristics for patentability.108 The invention must be judged novel, useful,
and non-obvious in order to be properly patented. If the invention fails these
conditions, then the patent will not issue; or if the patent does issue and the
invention is later found to fail these conditions, then the effect of claiming is
null. The claims are also ineffective, or will never be given administrative
certification, if the patent document fails to adequately describe and enable the
invention,109 meaning that the proper descriptive quality of the patent text might
be termed a felicity condition for the performativity of the claims.
The felicity conditions regarding disclosure are of particular importance as a
window into the performative entanglement of the subject of the patent text with
the object of the patent text. It might be tempting to believe that the patentability
disclosure requirements are simply requirements relating to the contents of the
document, but it is clearly the case that enablement and disclosure are to a large
degree qualities drawn from the construction of the invention. This is most
apparent in the case of inventions that are difficult or impossible to describe,
such as certain biological materials. The character of these inventions is such
that they do not lend themselves to textual description, and considerable
ingenuity has gone into finding ways to satisfy the disclosure conditions for such
inventions.110 Additionally, the Supreme Court has hinted in its recent
jurisprudence that disclosure requirements of the patent are not simply textual
drafting expectations, but are patentability requirements along with utility, nonobviousness, and the like.111 These doctrinal hints suggest two critical insights
regarding performativity: first, that there may be a vital relationship between
descriptive statements and performative statements; and second, that one cannot
easily separate the qualities of an object described by a text from the qualities of
the text itself.
An illocutionarily effective patent will also necessarily have complied with the
formal process of patent application and certification by the relevant government
See supra notes 36–39 and accompanying text.
Charles Bazerman, Systems of Genres and Enactment of Social Intentions, in GENRE AND THE NEW
RHETORIC 67, 72 (Aviva Freedman & Peter Medway eds., 1994).
109 35 U.S.C. § 112.
110 See, e.g., Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe, Inc., 296 F.3d 1316, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
(holding that public deposit of biological materials may satisfy statutory disclosure
requirements).
111 Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd., 535 U.S. 722, 736 (2002)
(rejecting the argument that patent disclosure provisions “concern the form of the application
and not the subject matter of the invention”).
107
108
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agency. This is unusual among forms of intellectual property, most of which
become operative without a formal administrative process.112 There is no
patentable invention, there are no exclusive rights, until they are declared by the
Patent Office to meet the statutory standards. Therefore, for patents, a critical
felicity condition is successful prosecution of the application through the Patent
Office, to issue. And this in turn necessarily means that the nature of the claims,
as a text, is dynamic depending upon the procedural status of the document.113
Claims are written into the application, which is then examined by bureaucrats
at the Patent Office, and if approved may eventually form the text of the issued
patent. The application thus constitutes a draft or proposal of the governmentally
sanctioned document. The locutionary act of claiming remains the same
throughout the process; the language, grammar, and syntax expressed by the
applicant remains the same. However, the illocutionary act changes. The
imprimatur of federal approval shifts the claims from assertive to declarative.
Prior to issue, the claims in the application asserted a right to recognition of
exclusivity and ownership within the technological parameters of the claim. After
issue, the claims in the published patent declare the scope of such rights and
change the status of technology reading on the claim text.
The change in illocutionary effect from application to issue invites us to
further focus on the performative character of the issued patent. The felicity
conditions necessary for an effective patent performative have been met, at least
provisionally, on issue of the patent–the application has been through an
examination process, certified as meeting the statutory requirements, formatted
in the proper textual configuration, and officially endorsed by the relevant
governmental authority.114 This is to say that the issued patent enrolls the proper
institutional support, that it cites to and re-inscribes the proper sustaining legal
norms and standards. Indeed, the patent document, along with its accompanying
prosecution history, is an extended exercise in citing and enrolling the proper
social resources. Note that such conditions may fail later; patents may be
challenged in federal court or before an authorized review Board of the Patent
Office in order to demonstrate that one or more of these conditions is defective,
that the proper scaffolding of social dispositifs is lacking.
In addition to the illocutionary force of the claims, we must also interrogate
certain other implicit declarations and performative effects of the patent
document. Most notably, in declaring the invention to constitute an invention,
and delineating the exclusive boundaries of the claims, the patent implicitly
declares the individual named on the patent to be an inventor. The inventor is of
Dan L. Burk & Jessica Reyman, Patents as Genre: A Prospectus, 26 L. & LIT. 163, 198 (2014).
Bazerman, supra note 30, at 50. Bazerman’s pioneering analysis of patents as speech acts
attributes to the application an illocutionary demand for the patent examiner to recognize the
patentability of the invention, to which issue of the patent is a perlocutionary result. Id. at 51;
Bazerman, supra note 105, at 85. Even from a purely structuralist standpoint, this strikes the
legal analyst as an overly naïve characterization of patent prosecution.
114 Bazerman, supra note 30, at 48.
112
113
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course named on the face of the patent, but it is tempting to dismiss this as a
purely ministerial indication as to the source of the claimed invention. To the
contrary, the Patent Office by means of the patent effectively declares that the
person or persons attributed on the fact of the document (and natural persons
must always be attributed, never juridical persons) are, by definition, inventors,
meaning that they have achieved something extraordinary–literally, they have
conceived a technology that could not be conceived by those of ordinary skill.115
While it may be tempting to consider such inventorship a perlocutionary,
follow-on effect of the patent grant, recall that necessary and contingent causality
may be considered the distinction between illocution and perlocution.
Inventorship is a necessary status change that occurs with the issue of the patent;
there is no invention without an inventor, and vice versa. We might just as well
say that the declaration of the inventor’s name on the face of the document
necessarily requires the declaration of an invention. There are, to be certain,
numerous contingent follow-on effects of the patent; the patent owner becomes
responsible for maintenance fees, gains certain status in any subsequent antitrust
action, can license the claimed invention if she chooses. But the creation of an
inventor is essential to the declaration of an invention.
For that matter, although it may be less apparent, the entire specification of
the patent document serves in a performative function. Claims are part of the
patent specification, and they entail an explicit declaration, but the remainder of
the document entails an implicit declaration or set of declarations in disclosing
how to make and use the invention.116 The patent disclosure is often thought of
as being descriptive language, that describes the claimed invention and “teaches”
its implementation.117 That is certainly what the patent statute requires it to do.118
But in doing so, the specification defines the invention as an invention, objectifying
and reifying it in a way that allows for commodification.119 The patent disclosure
stabilizes the features of the claimed invention in a particular configuration. The
document also implicitly establishes the claimed invention as an extraordinary
advance over the prior art, much as it inherently establishes the superior abilities
of the inventor. Thus, the patent document as a whole, not merely the explicit
claims, is imbued with illocutionary force regarding the textual objects that it
articulates.

See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (requiring that patentable inventions cannot have been obvious to those
of ordinary skill).
116 See 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2012).
117 See Guinda & Pellón supra note 105, at 180-81 (characterizing patent content in terms of
technical feasibility). See also Sean B. Seymore, The Teaching Function of Patents, 85 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 621, 629 (2010) (promoting the role of patents as technical communication).
118 35 U.S.C. § 112(a).
119 See Dan L. Burk, Calculative Patents, 99 TEX. L. REV. ONLINE 183 (describing the framing of
patents as calculated goods).
115
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B. PATENT PERLOCUTION

Our discussion of patents in Austinian perspective lays the groundwork for
us to consider patents in a broader enactments of performative social action.
Following Butler and Barnes, we shift our attention from the linguistic and
illocutionary effects of patents to the perlocutionary role of patents in fabricating
social reality. In some cases this activity builds on Austinian illocution; in other
instances the two will diverge. For example, we have drawn a distinction above
between the Austinian performativity of the claims in the patent application and
the issued patent.120 But note that either text, pre or post grant, may enact
Butlerian or social institutional performativity. The illocutionary force of the
patent declaration may be dependent in large part on the Patent Office’s
certification of the inventor’s claims, a declarative endorsement that the
application lacks. Networks of social actors, however, come into alignment even
with the applicant’s assertion of inventorship. Social action may occur in
conjunction with, or entirely apart from linguistic illocution.
Our task now is to discover the mechanisms by which patents enact reality in
this strong sense of performativity. We may begin with the pervasive trope that
patents are property, and should be considered much is the same as other
property, particularly real property.121 Happily, a number of previous
commentators have thought about property, in the guise of real property or
physical chattels, from the standpoint of social performance.122 Marc Poirier
argues that property is a Butlerian performative; that performing property is
performing community.123 On this view, the social practices associated with
property channel civic behaviors, inscribing personal responsibility, reciprocity,
and civic engagement in those associated with real property regimes.124 Nicholas
Blomley pushes this argument a step further, showing how property is
constitutive of social reality in a Barnesian sense, so that subjects and objects of
property emerge as it is performed.125

See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Intellectual Property is Still Property, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
108, 109 (1990).
122 Marc R. Poirier, The Virtue of Vagueness in Taking Doctrine, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 93 (2002);
Blomley, supra note 80.
123 Poirier, supra note 122, at 153.
124 Id. at 154–55.
125 Blomley, supra note 80, at 33–34. There have also been suggestions that patent law’s kissing
cousin, copyright, might be approached from a performativity perspective. Sonia K.
Katyal, Performance, Property, and the Slashing of Gender in Fan Fiction, 14 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC.
POL'Y & L. 461, 473 (2006); Andrew Gilden, Copyright Essentialism and the Performativity of
Remedies, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1123 (2013). Gilden briefly expands this treatment to
intellectual property generally, without excavating the particular doctrinal turnings of any
individual branch of IP. Andrew Gilden, Intellectual Property’s Queer Turn, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF LAW AND HUMANITIES 549, 551 (Simon Stern et al. eds., 2020).
120
121

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2022

21

Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 29, Iss. 2 [2022], Art. 2

2022]

PATENT PERFORMATIVITY

301

Following this line of argument, we might propose that, as in the case of real
property, patents do not simply describe the state of the world–the characteristics
of a new and useful device, and how to make and to use it–but also enact that
device, and enable social activity around the device, to which the performance
of patenting is essential.126 Here again, the comparison to property in land is
useful (although perhaps not in the way that its proponents intended). Patents
are frequently compared to the boundaries defined in deeds for land,127 and often
the ideological maneuvering of such comparisons is somewhat suspect,128 but in
this case the comparison seems entirely appropriate. Just as the definitional
borders of a deed or map create rather than describe a parcel of land, so the
definitional bordering of patent claims creates the invention, and in tandem
creates the inventor.
In this act of social fabrication, we may say that patents are simulacra or
representations that hold the invention together. Here I use the term simulacrum
in the manner proposed by Baudrillard: models and simulacra do not represent
their subjects, rather they define and engender the subjects that they represent.129
This effect is well documented in areas such as cartography; we often think of
maps as depicting the geography and borders of nations and territories when
quite the opposite is true. Maps do not describe the borders of a territory, or
even the natural features of a polity’s geography, but rather define borders and
features so as to fabricate the state as an entity.130 In doing so, maps impose their
representations on the world, establishing social entities that could not exist but
for their mapping (which, not coincidentally, is the reason cartography has
historically been a foundational activity of nation-states and empires).131 Patents
engage the world in the same fashion, and it would not be too far off to say that
patents are politics by other means.
See Law & Urry, supra note 89, at 391 (describing the characteristics of performativity).
See, e.g., Tun-Jen Chiang, Fixing Patent Boundaries, 108 Mich. L. Rev. 523, 527 (2010); Jeffrey
A. Lefstin, The Measure of the Doubt: Dissent, Indeterminacy, and Interpretation at the Federal Circuit,
58 HASTINGS L.J. 1025, 1025 (2007). This is also a common trope in judicial decisions, see,
e.g., Envirotech Corp. v. Al George, Inc., 730 F.2d 753, 759 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Kara Tech. Inc.,
v. Stamps.com Inc., 582 F.3d 1341, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Scaltech Inc. v. Retec/Tetra, L.L.C.,
178 F.3d 1378, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
128 See Mark A. Lemley, What’s Different About Intellectual Property?, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1097, 1097–
1100 (2005) (questioning the analogy of intellectual property to land); see also ALEXANDRA
GEORGE, CONSTRUCTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 65 (2012) (noting that comparisons of
intellectual property to tangible property are so facile as to be turned to almost any purpose).
129 Jean Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulations, in JEAN BAUDRILLARD, SELECTED WRITINGS 166
(Mark Poster Jacques Mourrain trans., 2d ed. 2001).
130 J.B. Harley, Text and Contexts in the Interpretation of Early Maps, in FROM SEA CHARTS TO
SATELLITE IMAGES: INTERPRETING NORTH AMERICAN HISTORY THROUGH MAPS 3–4 (David
Buisseret. ed., 1990); P. LAXTON, THE NEW NATURE OF MAPS: ESSAYS IN THE HISTORY OF
CARTOGRAPHY 52–53 (2001).
131 J.B. Harley, Maps, Knowledge and Power, in THE ICONOGRAPHY OF LANDSCAPE: ESSAYS ON
THE SYMBOLIC REPRESENTATION, DESIGN AND USE OF PAST ENVIRONMENTS 277, 282 (Denis
E. Cosgrove & Stephen Daniels eds., 1988).
126
127
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We are inclined to talk about patentability as if there are classes of objects in
the world that have the qualities of novelty, utility, and non-obviousness, and so
which qualify for description and claiming by means of a patent. We might even
be willing to go a bit farther and admit that the qualities of novelty, utility, and
non-obviousness are malleable or subject to interpretation, created by the patent
system when they are defined by courts and patent examiners, and so constitute
legal constructs.132 Our usual reading of the patent document and the patent
system thus assumes the external existence of a device or process in the material
world, configured by an individual of more-than-ordinary-skill-in-the-art,
assembled from components existing at the time of invention.
But this inclination is precisely what Butler calls the “ruse of power” used to
form an object that will be suitable for control, while in the same act effectively
disavowing that production by claiming to discover the object apart from its
formation.133 In fact, all the doctrinal mainstays of patent law–the invention, the
inventor, and the PHOSITA–are brought into existence in relation to and under
the influence of the patent.134 There is no invention prior to its performance
through the patent, even though we often speak in such precedential terms.135
As with the invention, so too with the inventor. We typically say in patent
practice or scholarship that an inventor qualifies for and applies for a patent, but
it is equally the case that the patent qualifies, defines, and enacts the inventor.
The social role of the inventor by definition requires an invention, and the social
affordances of the invention are fundamental characteristics in enacting the
inventor.
Thus, the invention and the inventor do not have an independent existence
prior to, or apart from the patent, but are brought into existence by patent
performances. Performativity refutes the idea that there is a divide between the
“real world” and the patent, that there is a separate reality over which the social
construction of the “invention” is layered. Neither does the performative
perspective accept a division between an “inventor” who arranges and assembles
bits of matter and the bits that are arranged.136 The inventor and the invention
take their substance in relationship with one another, formed in the process of
assembly–the human actor is not a separate component but is rather integral to

See Jason Rantanen, The Malleability of Patent Rights, 2015 MICH. ST. L. REV. 895, 919 (2015).
Judith Butler, Sexual Inversions, in FOUCAULT AND THE CRITIQUE OF INSTITUTIONS 81, 87
(John Caputo & Mark Yount eds., 1993).
134 Cf. Law & Urry, supra note 89, at 396 (explaining that social affordances are made real by
social relationships).
135 See Burk & Reyman, supra note 112, at 184.
136 Cf. Blomley, supra note 80, at 39 (explaining that performative assemblages do not
distinguish between human and non-human elements).
132
133

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2022

23

Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 29, Iss. 2 [2022], Art. 2

2022]

PATENT PERFORMATIVITY

303

result. Patents are performed when these elements reinforce and stabilize one
another in a relational combination.137
Certainly there are prior material objects and physical actions, but they have
meaning as “inventions” or “innovation” only in the context of becoming such
by virtue of the patent’s enactment. This is true whether or not they prove to
legally qualify for the patent. Some activities that fail to qualify might constitute
inventive or innovative actions that simply do not rise to the level of patent
recognition–sub-patentable innovation.138 Some activities may simply be judged
not to be innovative at all, but are considered routine and conventional: peeling
potatoes and walking the dog, let us say. But patent performativity encompasses
them all, placing them in the categories I have just mentioned (as well as possibly
into others). Much as Steinberg observes regarding property law generally,
patents are relied upon as “the voice of reason that we use to tidy up the messy
and dynamic world of nature.”139
This is not to say they are simply a social construction of nature; rather, it is
to say that despite being purely intertextual,140 patents are entangled with the
world, with their subject matter, with their drafters, examiners, and enforcers.
Alignment with these perlocutionary actors is not a question of fidelity to the
material world; the specification of the invention in the patent does not need to
be accurate, in the sense of describing a phenomenon or artifact in the world.
The question is not whether patent disclosures are accurate or inaccurate so
much as whether they are felicitous, which is to say whether they are successfully
actualized in the world.141
In order to be felicitous, the patent needs to be compatible with existing
institutions and resources, and successful in enrolling such resources to
coordinate its own presence.142 As Latour observes, sentences do not hold
together because they are true, rather, we say that they are true because they hold
together.143 Similarly, we are wont to say that an invention is eligible for a patent
because it has the qualities of novelty, utility, and non-obviousness; but to the
contrary, because the patents are able to align the proper constellation of actors
and actions, the subject of the patent is treated as constituting a novel, useful,
and non-obvious invention. Patents are performed when the proper assemblage
Michel Callon, What Does It Mean to Say that Economics is Performative?, in DO ECONOMISTS
MAKE MARKETS? ON THE PERFORMATIVITY OF ECONOMICS 311, 319 (Donald MacKenzie et
al. eds., 2007).
138 See Jerome J. H. Reichman, Of Green Tulips and Legal Kudzu: Repacking Rights in Subpatentable
Innovation, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1743, 1762 (2000).
139 THEODORE STEINBERG, SLIDE MOUNTAIN: OR, THE FOLLY OF OWNING NATURE 50
(1995).
140 Bazerman, supra note 30, at 51.
141 See Blomley, supra note 80, at 42.
142 See id. at 25 (discussing felicity in terms of enrollment).
143 BRUNO LATOUR, THE PASTEURIZATION OF FRANCE 185 (Alan Sheridan trans., 1st ed.
1993).
137
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of entities interacts to cooperate and stabilize one another; inventions and
inventors exist by enrolling the array of elements necessary to enact themselves
in the world.144
Following Butler, we then observe that it is not only the declarative act of the
patent claims that exercises performative force. Patent claims are enacted
through the performance of a host of associated social actions, and enacted
claims contribute to the reality constituting the roles surrounding them. The
patent is enacted by networks of institutions and actors:145 not only by the
examination of a specialized corps of civil servants, but by the deliberations and
declarations of a specialized federal court, by the declarations and deliberations
of non-specialized federal courts including the Supreme Court, by the drafting
and consideration of a specialized cadre of professional representatives, and by
the licensing negotiations between business entities–indeed, by a series of
communities that are formed by, and interact with the normative conventions of
patent claiming.146 In their interactions with the patent, these practitioners
perform distinct social, cultural, and political norms by reiterating and reinscribing them.
IV. ENACTING PATENTS
We have seen in the previous sections that patents are constructed not only
from declarative claiming, but from a wide array of associated socio-material
practices. We now move from an outline of patent performativity to consider
how patents are performed and how that effects the gender questions we began
with. We want to focus here on the world that is reflexively enacted by
performing patents, on the roles that patents allow, and on the characteristics
that patents demand that adjacent communities take on. In particular, viewing
patents through the lens of social, institutional, or Barnesian performativity
allows us to trace the practices and relationships through which patents are
performed, and to determine how patent performances constitute reality in their
own particular image.
Regarding patents in this fashion requires us to invert our usual thinking
somewhat. We typically say in patent practice or scholarship that the patent
describes the invention (and indeed there is a large literature devoted to how this
ought properly to occur).147 We typically say that an invention qualifies for or

See Blomley, supra note 80, at 39 (explaining that property is performed when assemblages
of actors stabilize and reinforce one another).
145 Cf. Butler supra note 50, at 150 (explaining that performativity is realized via organization
of human and non-human networks).
146 See Burk & Reyman, supra note 112, at 179–80 (describing the communities and actors
surrounding the patent document).
147 See, e.g., Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Do Patents Disclose Useful Information?, 25 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 531, 536 (2012); Jason A. Rantanen, Peripheral Disclosure, 74 U. PITT. L. REV. 1 (2012);
144
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meets the criteria for patenting, as if the invention were something exterior to
the patent, that the patent language merely reflects. But in considering patent
performativity, we should rather inquire what patents are making when they
purport only to be describing.
In order to think about patents in this way, we must ask ourselves, what does
it mean to perform acts of invention, not in the sense of chemical
experimentation or mechanical construction, but in the sense of a social
enactment? What does it mean to perform innovation or to perform exclusivity?
For the inquiry I have posed here, the questions we should be pursuing are not
so much whether innovations display the qualities of utility or novelty or nonobviousness, but rather what the concepts of utility and novelty and nonobviousness do to and do for those who practice innovation, those who engage
in it, and those who trade in it.
A. PERFORMING DETACHMENT

The first social reality that patents enact might be described as isolation and
segmentation–patent doctrine and practice incorporate tropes of artificial
distinction from the context in which patents function. For example, patent
practice and doctrine artificially attempt to separate nature and culture,
distinguishing the work of human ingenuity from products or phenomena of the
natural world.148 This is perhaps clearest in patent law’s subject matter
jurisprudence; categories of patent-eligible subject matter listed in the statute
entail categories such as machines and articles of manufacture that are generally
regarded as human handiwork.149 The Supreme Court’s gloss on the statute takes
this logic a step further, asserting that the statute extends to “anything under the
sun that is made by man.”150 The Court specifically excludes from patent
eligibility categories such as products of nature and laws of nature that are
insufficiently distinguishable from entities found in the material world.151
As I have described in previous work, this bifurcation makes little sense as a
logical matter; all human artifacts are part of the material or natural world, and
all human artifacts, including patentable devices, are comprised of materials and

Sean B. Seymore, The Teaching Function of Patents, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 621 (2010); Jeanne
Fromer, Patent Disclosure, 94 IOWA L. REV. 539, 545 (2009).
148 See Marilyn Strathem, Cutting the Network, 2 J. ROYAL ANTHROPOLOGICAL INST. 517, 523–
35 (1996).
149 See 35 U.S.C. § 101; see also American Fruit Growers, Inc. v. Brogdex Co., 283 U.S.
1, 11 (1931) (defining patent eligible manufacture as “the production of articles for use from
raw or prepared materials by giving to these materials new forms, qualities, properties, or
combinations, whether by hand labor or by machinery”).
150 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980).
151 Id.; Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 70 (2012). See generally
Dan L. Burk, The Curious Incident of the Supreme Court in Myriad Genetics, 90 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 505 (2014) (discussing in detail the Supreme Court’s subject matter cases).
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processes embedded in the natural world.152 There is nothing unnatural about
patented inventions or about human activity in building patented inventions.
Rather than a logical distinction, the separation between invention and nature is
instead an ideological distinction, valorizing certain types of materials and
activities as deserving of a patent, and subordinating other materials and activities
on which the preferred activities are based.153 The categories to be designated
inventions are foregrounded against the backdrop of natural phenomena.
This dualism is closely related to similar ideological structures in the scientific
and engineering disciplines on which patentable innovation relies.154 Feminist
commentators have long noted that science and engineering adopt the
bifurcation between nature and culture in order to assume an ostensibly objective
stance in data collection, analysis, and application.155 By standing apart from the
material world, science projects the appearance of a dispassionate viewpoint.
This schema is also fundamentally related to the paucity of women in science
and engineering professions. Feminist commentators have noted that the roles
assigned to women tend to be connected with conceptions of nature rather than
those of culture: emoting, child bearing, nurturing.156 This inevitably places
women in either explicit (“Girls can’t do math”) or implicit (“You will have to
arrange extra child care for evenings you stay late at the lab”) social dissonance
with the performance of science and engineering, and so with the performance
of patent inventorship related to those fields.
Patent practice and doctrine also attempt to bifurcate the claimed invention
from the matrix of practices and technologies that have gone before it, from the
‘prior art.’ To constitute a patentable invention, the subject of the patent claims
cannot have been previously disclosed in the prior art, and must be distinctively
non-obvious over the prior art.157 Yet, as our discussion of performativity above
would predict, this inevitably means that in order to distinguish itself from the
prior art, the characteristics of the claimed invention become dependent upon
the prior art. To be novel or nonobvious over the prior art requires that the
invention inhabit the same category or field as the prior art, otherwise there is no
basis for comparison. Thus, asserting a separation from the prior art inextricably
embeds the invention within the prior art.

See Dan L. Burk, Edifying Thoughts of a Patent Watcher: The Nature of DNA, 60 UCLA L. REV.
DISCOURSE 92, 97 (2013); see also Burk, supra note 151, at 533 (questioning whether for patent
eligibility one can ever find an “unnatural or artificial” process).
153 See Dan L. Burk, Feminism and Dualism in Intellectual Property, 15 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y
& L. 183, 195 (2007) (examining the doctrinal separation of nature and culture).
154 Donna Haraway, Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege of Partial
Perspective, 14 FEMINIST STUD. 575, 592 (1988).
155 SUSAN BORDO, THE FLIGHT TO OBJECTIVITY 8 (Robert C. Neville ed., 1987); EVELYN FOX
KELLER, REFLECTIONS ON GENDER AND SCIENCE 6-8 (1985).
156 Sherry B. Ortner, Is Female to Male as Nature is to Culture?, in WOMAN, CULTURE, AND
SOCIETY 68, 73-80 (Michelle Zimbalest Rosaldo & Louise Lamphere eds., 1974).
157 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103 (2012).
152
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And, as with the invention, so with the inventor. The novelty and nonobviousness requirements as a practical matter separate the claimed invention
from the contributions of those who have gone before, distinguishing the
inventor’s contribution from those of previous contributors. Similarly, to satisfy
the subject matter requirement, the inventor is also characterized as contributing
something “markedly different” than what is found in the state of nature.158 A
felicitous patent application is framed not only to separate the claimed invention
from the public domain and the prior art, but to frame the inventor as a superior
artisan—the inventor’s contribution must reflect extraordinary, not ordinary
skill. This distinction inevitably separates and distinguishes the inventor from the
community in which the invention is necessarily embedded. And as we will see,
this characteristic of patenting sits at odds with the relational worldview that
many commentators have equated with feminist ethics and viewpoints.159
B. PERFORMING IMMATERIALITY

What follows from this first set of characteristics is a related, second set of
patent performatives that might be termed immateriality or rarefication: the
construction of a substantive patentable entity distinct from materiality, and the
semiotic characteristics of that construction; what Karen Barad might decry as
the elevation of language over materiality.160 This is in part a consequence of
patents being entirely intertextual; unlike other forms of intellectual property that
arise with the creation and use of the subject matter, patents require a
documentary description of the subject matter and of the scope of the owner’s
rights.161 This defines the invention in its entirety; at no time during the tenure
of the patent does an inventor have to produce a physical, corporeal invention.
American inventorship was long defined in terms of conception and reduction to
practice. Although the current patent statute focuses on the act of filing an
application rather than the act of inventing and makes no mention of conception
or reduction to practice, these concepts remain deeply imbedded in current
doctrine. Conception is classically defined as the formation in the mind of the
inventor of the claimed invention as it is to be reduced to practice.162 Reduction
to practice is the instantiation of the invention as conceived. Although both are
required for a completed patent application, only the former is in fact required
to qualify as an invention. The Supreme Court has held that an invention may be
complete for patentability purposes when it is “ready for patenting,” even if not

In re Roslin Inst., 750 F. 3d 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
Dan L. Burk, Do Patents Have Gender?, 19 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 881, 908-09
(2011).
160 Karen Barad, Posthumanist Performativity: Toward an Understanding of How Matter Comes to Matter,
28 SIGNS 801 (2003).
161 35 U.S.C. § 112.
162 See Townsend v. Smith, 36 F.2d 292, 296 (C.C.P.A. 1929).
158
159
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yet reduced to practice.163 Indeed, once the invention has been fully conceived,
the inventor may be done with it. According to the courts, reduction to practice
is the work of the common practitioner, not the work of an inventor.164 The
inventor need not even know that the conception actually works; that is a task
for lesser hands.165
The result is that, in patent law, what counts as inventorship is mental work,
rather than physical work.166 As Butler observes, “when we judge, we locate the
phenomenon we judge within a given framework, and our judgment requires a
stabilization of the phenomenon.”167 The invention is stabilized within a
documentary framework. The patent text describing the conceived invention is
framed and judged against other texts that set forth or describe the prior art.
Indeed, the inventive process need never produce the actual invention; the act
of filing a properly disclosed patent application document counts as constructive
reduction to practice of the invention. Language is therefore paramount; the
invention need not be materially enacted; it need only be linguistically enacted. It
becomes a legally cognizable entity by virtue of being described, not by virtue of
physical labor.
The result is that the patent system skirts all the messy and problematic details
of materiality by elevating conceptual production over corporeal production. The
characteristics of the invention and its attendant inventor are largely divorced
from the struggle to get recalcitrant physical material to behave; that effort is the
duty of the “mere artisan” once the vaunted inventor has provided a fully enabled
conception.168 The material labor of innovation thus becomes a form of the
“invisible” work that feminist scholars have noted typically goes unseen and
unrewarded.169 Masculinized social hierarchy elevates certain forms of labor and
renders other labor unseen and unrecognized as menial, common, or unskilled.
Essential physical labor of care providers, janitors, or sanitation workers is
culturally coded as “feminine” and frequently delegated to workers of lower
status, often women or persons of color.170 The manual labor provided by a host
of technicians, assistants, aides is similarly crucial to realizing an invention, but
doctrinally overlooked (and likely institutionally underpaid).

Pfaff v. Wells Electronics, Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 66 (1998).
Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr Lab’ys., Inc., 40 F.3d 1223, 1228 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
165 Applegate v. Scherer, 332 F.3d 571, 573–74 (C.C.P.A. 1964).
166 See Burk, supra note 153, at 189–90.
167 Judith Butler, The Sensibility of Critique: Response to Asad and Mahmood, in IS CRITIQUE
SECULAR? BLASPHEMY, INJURY, AND FREE SPEECH 101, 104 (Talal Asad ed., 2009).
168 Townsend v. Smith, 36 F.2d 292, 295 (C.C.P.A. 1929).
169 See Arlene K. Daniels, Invisible Work, 34 SOC. PROBS. 403 (1987).
170 MAXINE L. MARGOLIS, MOTHERS AND SUCH: VIEWS OF AMERICAN WOMEN AND WHY
THEY CHANGED 262-63 (University of California Press 1984).
163
164
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C. PERFORMING HIERARCHY

From these performatives follows a third component of patent enactment
that might be designated as elitism or selectivity. Patents assume and impose a
hierarchy of distinction, separating and stratifying actors through classifications
of inventive merit. Unlike physical property that can be possessed and enjoyed
by anyone (or at least, anyone with sufficient wealth to acquire it), patents are
assigned according to a standard of inventive superiority, from which they can
afterward be divested or assigned by the inventor. This dimension of patent
enactment is tightly coupled with the previously described performance of
rarified or singular invention, isolating and valorizing the inventive contributions
of particular actors above all the others who were active in the stabilization and
realization of the invention.
As already noted, patentability is measured against the ability of a fictional
person of “ordinary skill.” Lurking behind the statutory person of ordinary skill
remains the figure of the “romantic inventor,” an implicit solitary archetypical
mastermind who brings the fruits of his intellect to the common masses.171 At
one time, the Supreme Court equated patentable innovation with a required
“flash of genius.” Although the Court has since repudiated this test for
patentability, commentators have observed that inventions produced by routine
or tedious labor are disadvantaged over those that occur from sudden insights.172
Whether or not genius is an explicit requirement of inventorship, patents still
require an inventor to be an individual of extraordinary skill in the art–this is
implied by the statute, which explicitly denies patents to inventions that could be
conceived by one of ordinary skill; ergo the patentable invention must the
product of extraordinary skill.173
In alignment with these assumptions and with performative qualities of
detachment and rarefication, the paradigm case for invention remains the
“romantic” or “heroic” solo inventor. In fact, we know that the majority of
patents today stem from group efforts, and the solo inventor, whether genius or
plodder, is a comparative rarity.174 The patent system allows for collaborative
contributions to the claimed invention but under fastidious and restrictive
requirements. To be acknowledged as a sole inventor, a contributor to innovative
work must provide the full and enabling plan of the invention, which others put

CHRISTOPHER BEAUCHAMP, INVENTED BY LAW: ALEXANDER GRAHAM BELL AND THE
PATENT THAT CHANGED AMERICA 63 (Harvard University Press 2015) (describing the trope
of the Romantic “genius”); Michael S. Carolan, Constructing the “Pure” Inventor: Individual,
Collective, and Corporate Authorship within Patent Law, 27 NEW GENETICS & SOC’Y, 301 (2008)
(same).
172 Jacob S. Sherkow, Negativing Invention, 2011 BYU L. REV. 1091 (2011).
173 35 U.S.C. § 103 (declaring the patentability requirement that the claimed invention not be
obvious to one of ordinary skill).
174 Mark A. Lemley, The Myth of the Sole Inventor, 110 MICH. L. REV. 709 (2012).
171
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into practice.175 A co-inventor may contribute something less than the full plan
of the invention, but the contribution must be to the conception of the
invention—not simply to its physical instantiation or reduction to practice.176
Joint inventorship can be recognized on the document, when a collaborator
contributes the conception of at least one of the claims.177
But this standard again draws the line at acknowledging a particular type of
mental work, inventive conception, which is delineated by the structure of the
claims themselves. Collaborators whose ideas, suggestions, and input are not
codified within the claims are excluded even if their contributions were essential
to the success of the inventive process.178 Moreover, beyond the contributions
of those who explicitly meet the statutory requirements for inventorship, there
inevitably lies a vast body of input from those who have not contributed to the
conception of any given claim, but without whom the invention would never
have come to pass. As we have already noted with regard to materiality, patent
inventorship doctrines effectively place the vast assisting body of technicians and
support staff that enable any inventive activity into an unacknowledged
position.179
Thus, patents go only to a cadre of elite innovators, where the elite
classification is determined by the patent itself. Elitism typically carries a negative
connotation, although that coloring is contextual—at times we applaud or at least
acquiesce in classificatory exclusion. Everyone should have the opportunity to
vote in a democracy, but not everyone should perform brain surgery or play in
the World Series. Thus, we might suppose that our current selective enactment
of inventorship is justified because technical innovation is one of those contexts
where extraordinary skill is essential, and so patents should be reserved for those
rare individuals. But one almost immediately runs into trouble with this
justification, in that patents are available to accidental or serendipitous
discoveries, and so can accrue to anyone who is lucky enough to stumble across
an eligible invention, regardless of actual skill. Indeed, the ordinary skill
requirement is intended to be an objective standard assessing whether the
invention could or should have been the product of extraordinary skill, not
whether the invention actually was.180
We might say that the line must be drawn somewhere, but that of course
presupposes that a line indeed has to be drawn. One could draw other kinds of
lines or forgo lines for a continuum. Some commentators have suggested that
Agawam Co. v. Jordan, 74 U.S. 583, 602–03 (1869).
Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr Lab’ys. Inc., 40 F.3d 1223, 1229–30 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
177 SmithKline Diagnostics, Inc. v. Helena Lab’ys Corp., 859 F.2d 878, 888 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
178 See Brown v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 866 F. Supp. 439, 445 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (holding
that contribution of data and recognition of the presence of a novel immunodeficiency virus
did not constitute inventorship of methods for detecting the virus).
179 See supra notes 168–170 and accompanying text.
180 Michael Abramowicz & John F. Duffy, The Inducement Standard of Patentability, 120 YALE L.J.
1590, 1621 (2011).
175
176
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recognition is as important as exclusivity, implying that one could well have a
system where many contributors are acknowledged or credited, even if all do not
receive exclusive rights.181 One could also envision any number of other systems
involving incremental attribution or remuneration for the invention. My point
here is not to select from among the multitude of other possibilities that arise
once we admit that our current conception of inventorship is not a natural law,
but rather to emphasize the possibility that we have currently implemented
systems that enact inventorship in a particular way, so that it enacts the inventor
in a particular way. And the particular way we have adopted instantiates norms
of hierarchy that (among other effects) inevitably impact the participation of
women as inventors.
D. PERFORMING EXTRACTION

The enactments described thus far support and promote a further set of
performative tropes of dominance and extraction. We have already observed,
following Butler, that Austin’s perlocutionary effects and illocutionary effects are
not separate; causal outcomes from a declaration may become constitutive
effects over time.182 Such performative precession between perlocution and
illocution is apparent in the market framing of patents. Patents are framed as
devices for the exploration and generation of new goods, and thus for the
generation of new markets.183 They are at the same time framed as devices for
engaging existing mechanisms of commodification and exploitation—as
property rights that may be licensed, sold, devised, and traded like any other
property.184 Consequently, patents precess between exploration and exploitation,
between formative perlocution and established illocution.185 The patent has
immediate illocutionary force by citing to and drawing upon established
conventions of law and trade; it creates perlocutionary effects as it introduces
new associations and relationships.
This resulting logic of extraction is pronounced throughout patent law and
follows from what we have already seen regarding performance of isolation and
of rarefication. We have, for example, already noted the separation of patenteligible subject matter from patent ineligible laws and products of nature.186 The
Supreme Court has been relatively forthcoming in stating that some materials
and processes, no matter how valuable or innovative, must be designated
“natural” so that they are free for all inventors to draw upon–in other words,
Jeanne C. Fromer, Expressive Incentives in Intellectual Property, 98 VA. L. REV. 1745 (2012);
Jason Rantanen & Sarah E. Jack, Patents as Credentials, 76 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 311 (2019).
182 See supra note 69–76 and accompanying text.
183 See Callon, supra note 67, at 166 (discussing the role of commodified innovation and
invention in constructing exploratory markets).
184 Id.
185 See id.
186 See supra notes 148–151 and accompanying text.
181
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valorizing some creations requires subordinating others to build a reserve from
which patentable devices may be extracted.187 The Court is fond of offering
Newton and Einstein as examples of creators whose discoveries would be patent
ineligible, because patents on such fundamental discoveries would impede other
inventors who require them as the basis for their subsequent creations.188 There
is, of course, some irony in declaring some discoveries to be so valuable that they
must remain freely accessible for others to exploit.
In recent work, Jessica Lai insightfully notes that patent law’s excluded
subject matter encompasses categories that might be categorized as feminine or
feminized; these are ineligible for patent protection until they are put through a
process of masculinized industrialization, at which point they become patent
eligible.189 The enactment of patentable extraction may therefore encompass
only those materialities that lend themselves to technological exploitation and
control, so that the attributes necessary for domination by means of the patent
are effectively projected onto the subject matter of the patent. Thus, the patent
system may be excluding technological development that might be socially coded
as "feminine," instead re-inscribing motivations to develop technologies that
facilitate and reinforce current social hierarchies, including gender hierarchies.190
This interplay of extraction and patent preclusion manifests itself in the
concept of the public domain. Ineligible subject matter, precluded from
patenting, becomes commonly available knowledge, falling into the “public
domain” from which it can be freely extracted for industrialization. The public
domain also comprises other categories of technical art that lack the requisite
novelty, utility, or inventiveness necessary for patenting. These items, too, may
be drawn upon to construct patentable devices. Indeed, federal law has been held
to preempt state law attempts to commodify categories that patent policy
requires must stay publicly accessible.191 Here again we see the inescapable
combination of separation and attachment; the claimed and proprietary
invention can exist only against the backdrop of the unclaimed and unowned
public domain.
Although the public domain has been lauded for its open availability as a
common resource unencumbered by proprietary restraints, a number of
commentators have noted that the absence of ownership claims makes resources
in the public domain category subject to untrammeled exploitation.192 Rather
than a patent-free zone, the public domain constitutes a pre-patent zone,
structured so as to fuel the generation of successive exclusive rights. Drawing
See Mayo Collaborative Serv. v. Prometheus Lab’ys, Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 71 (2012).
Id.
189 Jessica C. Lai, Gendered ‘Objective’ Patent Law: Of Binaries and Singularities, 47 J.L. SOC’Y 441
(2020).
190 Burk, supra note 159, at 906.
191 See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 162 (1989).
192 Anupam Chander & Madhavi Sunder, The Romance of the Public Domain, 92 CALIF. L. REV.
1331 (2004).
187
188
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from themes in eco-feminism regarding the open availability of shared material
resources, we may recognize the public domain as feminized, in the sense that it
is available and vulnerable to exploitation and extraction. There is a troubling
parallel in the discourse surrounding such extraction to themes of assault or rape,
in the seizure or wresting of resources away from “Mother Nature” or similar
feminized representations of the material world.193 This social coding of
exploitable resources impels society towards domineering and destructive forms
of technological development, and so further propagates exploitation of both
people and natural resources.194
E. PERFORMING EXCLUSION

A fifth dimension to patent performativity is the enactment of exclusion, which
again flows from and reinforces the prior performances of isolation, hierarchy,
and extraction. This is perhaps the core aspect of enacting patents; we are told
repeatedly and doggedly by courts, commentators, and practitioners that the
fundamental essence of the patent is the right to exclude. The patent entails the
right to use the coercive mechanisms of the state to exclude others from making,
using, selling, offering, or importing the claimed invention.195 Such patent
exclusivity is said to be the incentive that will prompt investment in new
technologies. Patents are by statute to be treated as personal property,196 and the
right to exclude is frequently said by patent proponents to constitute the essential
characteristic of property rights.197 Not coincidentally, patents are often
compared to the possessory rights of landholders, which allow legal exclusion
through actions such as trespass.
We have already noted that the linguistic boundaries of patent claims are
often compared to the “metes and bounds” of a deed to land.198 The trope
equating patents to real property is intended to justify notions of absolute
control, private ownership, and proprietary independence, for which real
property is asserted as a paradigm. There is of course, as Nicholas Blomley would
say, a mismatch between the script for this performance and its enactment;199
patents are not and never have been entirely exclusive, just as other forms of
property have never been entirely exclusive, despite the ideology of ownership
that attaches to entitlements.200 Real property, the exclusivity paradigm to which
See CAROLYN MERCHANT, THE DEATH OF NATURE 2-6, 189-90 (1980).
VAL PLUMWOOD, FEMINISM AND THE MASTERY OF NATURE (1993); JANET BIEHL,
RETHINKING ECOFEMINIST POLITICS (1991).
195 35 U.S.C. § 271(a).
196 35 U.S.C. § 261.
197 Easterbrook, supra note 121.
198 See supra notes 126–127 and accompanying text.
199 Blomley, supra note 80, at 28–29.
200 See Joseph Singer, No Right to Exclude: Public and Private Accommodations and Private Property,
90 NW. U. L. REV. 1283 (1996).
193
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patents are so often compared, has always been subject to hosts of easements,
regulations, restrictions, and encumbrances.201 Numerous scholars have pointed
out the embeddedness of property in concepts of community and social
relations, despite the tendency to idealize real property as a condition of
autonomous solitude.202
One might imagine similar communal concepts embedded in patent policy;
after all, patent policy often asserts that patents are tied to the public interest, but
this is seldom how patents are performed. The disconnection between patent
performance and enactment becomes apparent, for example, in the
consternation that occurs when the patent community is confronted with actual
practices, such as in the Supreme Court’s eBay v. MercExchange opinion that
indicated that equitable factors such as the public interest might sometimes
trump a patent owner’s claim to enforcement of exclusivity by means of an
injunction.203 One might have thought this decision would come as no great
surprise, given that the patent statute expressly states that injunctions must be
based on equitable considerations, but it was taken by many as an unconscionable
intrusion on the exclusivity of issued patents.204
This pervasive patent orthodoxy of dominance through singular, isolated,
exclusive rights stands in stark contrast to the work of feminist commentators
who have emphasized interconnectedness, community, and relational
thinking.205 This line of commentary derives in part from the work of Carol
Gilligan, who proposed that women tend to approach reasoning in a distinctly
“feminine” manner that is contextual, relational, and personal.206 Following
Gilligan, a large body of commentary argues that a feminine standpoint to
property might emphasize contextuality and responsibility instead of separation
and hierarchy.207 Just as patents define innovation in a particular way, so they
Dan L. Burk, Muddy Rules for Cyberspace, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 121, 123–24 (1999).
See JOSEPH SINGER, ENTITLEMENT: THE PARADOXES OF PROPERTY 9 (2000); see also
Gregory Alexander, COMMODITY AND PROPRIETY: COMPETING VISIONS OF PROPERTY IN
AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT 1776-1970, at 2 (1997) (observing that property is grounded in a
vision of social welfare); Laura Underkuffler, Property: A Special Right, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1033, 1046 (1996) (noting that property is by nature a social right).
203 eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
204 See, e.g., Adam Mossoff, Institutional Design in Patent Law: Private Property Rights or Regulatory
Entitlements, 92 SO. CAL. L. REV. 921, 938–39 (2019) (arguing that the eBay decision
undermines the reliability of patent property rights); see also F. Scott Kieff & Henry E. Smith,
How Not to Invent a Patent Crisis, in REACTING TO THE SPENDING SPREE: POLICY CHANGES WE
CAN AFFORD 55, 67 (Terry L. Anderson & Richard Sousa eds., 2009) (arguing that the eBay
decision improperly separates the standard for patent injunctions from that for real property
injunctions).
205 See Lisa R. Pruitt, A Survey of Feminist Jurisprudence, 16 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 183, 192–
93 (1994) (surveying the relational themes in feminist jurisprudence).
206 CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN’S
DEVELOPMENT 160 (1982).
207 See, e.g., SARAH KEENAN, SUBVERSIVE PROPERTY: LAW AND THE PRODUCTION OF SPACES
OF BELONGING (2016); Davina Cooper, Opening Up Ownership: Community Belonging, Belongings,
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define innovators in a particular way, but performing patent exclusivity may
misalign with a feminine standpoint that understands the self in relation to, rather
than in opposition to, others and the world.208
This dissonance seems manifest in the data characterizing the patent gender
gap. Empirically we know that female scientists and engineers are less likely than
their male counterparts to think about commercialization of their work, less likely
than their male counterparts to engage in self-promotion regarding their
discoveries, and thus less likely than their male counterparts to think about
patenting.209 The reflexive response to this difference is to favor training women
to think about commercialization, to encourage them to promote themselves,
and to assist them in applying for patents. That is the response we see now from
the USPTO and other responsible agencies.210
But as some feminist commentators have pointed out, the assumption that
women need to think more like men is itself a problematic expectation.211 It is
not altogether clear that valorizing commercialization, self-promotion, and
exclusivity of new discoveries is necessarily a productive or healthy way to think
about scientific and technological progress. Such performances tend to be distant
from and disassociated with the feminine role in the modern Western societies
that value patents. And it is more than a little problematic to ask, much like Henry
Higgins, why a woman cannot be more like a man, or at least to ask why female
inventors and entrepreneurs cannot be more isolated, elitist, hierarchical,
dominating, extractive, exploitative, and exclusive. Rather than assuming that
women must embrace such performances to enjoy the full benefits of the patent
system, perhaps patents need to be re-enacted to accommodate female
participation, and perhaps to encourage men to think about innovation more like
women.

and the Productive Life of Property, 32 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 625 (2007); Jennifer Nedelsky, Law,
Boundaries, and the Bounded Self, 30 REPRESENTATIONS 162 (1990).
208 See generally CATHERINE KELLER, FROM A BROKEN WEB: SEPARATION, SEXISM, AND SELF
(1986) (describing how different conceptions of identity form a web of understanding of
being).
209 Murray & Graham, supra note 9, at 682–83; Stephan & El-Gainainy, supra note 8, at 479–
80.
210 See, e.g., United States Patent & Trademark Office, Study of Underrepresented Classes
Chasing Engineering and Science Success: SUCCESS Act of 2018, at 21–25 (2019)
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/USPTOSuccessAct.pdf
(detailing
USPTO and SBA programs to encourage women and minority innovators to participate in
patenting).
211 Inmaculada de Melo-Martín, Patenting and the Gender Gap: Should Women Be Encouraged to
Patent More?, 19 SCI. & ENG. ETHICS 491 (2013) (questioning whether enhanced participation
of women in patenting would be socially desirable).
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V. CONCLUSION
There is an unfortunate irony in the present attention given to the gender gap
in patenting. Although doubtless well-intentioned, the concern that women are
excluded from the patent system helps to re-inscribe the centrality of patents by
insisting that women must be included in order to be fully realized as researchers,
as entrepreneurs, and as people.212 As Jessica Lai points out, the prevailing
portrayal of the gender gap in patenting to some extent lays the blame for the
deficit of female innovation on women for failing to conform–if only more
women were to go into science and engineering, adopt the right attitudes, make
the right connections, and pursue commercialization like their male counterparts,
they could profit from the patent system.213 This response implicitly assumes that
women are the aberrant actors who need to learn to adapt to the patent system,
rather than assuming that the fault lies in the patent system, which should
perhaps instead adapt to the needs and expectations of excluded women.
The exposition of performativity above should demonstrate why this
approach to closing the patent gender gap cannot succeed. The misalignment
between enacting invention and enacting gender will not be resolved by guiding
more women into science and engineering (as socially desirable as that effort may
be for any number of other reasons). The social roles of patents, not merely the
social roles of women, would require revision. Reconstituting innovation and
invention is no simple task given the reflexive circularity of patent enactment;
the norm of the masculine inventor is stabilized by a vast array of social
expectations which it in turn helps to stabilize.
Rather, the constraints imposed by patent performativity must form the basis
for their own reform. Here we turn back to Judith Butler, who shows how the
constraints of performative social norms may be turned to resist those same
norms. In the context of performative gender, Butler famously offers the
example of the transvestite, who performs gender transgressively.214 “Drag”
performances, according to Butler, appropriate the norms of gender, playing
them against themselves to rework the possibilities of gender.215 Such
observations point the way to parallel reworking of the social tropes associated
with patenting and innovation. Transgressive re-orientation of patent isolation,
elitism, hierarchy, dominance, extraction, and exclusivity might similarly expose
the performance of inventorship to re-interpretation and open new possibilities
for enacting innovation.

Cf. Blomley, supra note 80, at 47 (noting that critiques of property ownership models may
performatively re-enact those models by emphasizing their centrality).
213 See Jessica C. Lai, The Role of Patents as a Gendered Chameleon, 30 SOC. & L. STUD. 203, 206
(2020).
214 JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF IDENTITY 175
(1999).
215 Id.
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To be sure, Butler cautions that, at least in the case of gender, enactment
remains compelled, constrained, and effectively mandatory.216 Gender is a
characteristic on which societies force individuals to take some stance. Even
those who adopt non-binary or gender fluid performances must do so with
reference to the concept of gender, and to the dominance of masculine or
feminine norms. Society is perhaps less exercised with regard to inventorship
than it is with regard to gender–one need not necessarily engage with innovation,
although it should be noted that the failure to do so in effect takes a stand
regarding innovation, by making a choice not to be defined as an inventor. But
once the individual actively engages with the role of inventor, the reference
points are constrained and largely fixed. The inventor must, for example, by
definition be a person of extraordinary skill in the art, because if the invention
could be developed by one of ordinary skill, it is by definition unpatentable. The
choice to be an ordinary inventor is not currently accommodated within patent
enactment.
Thus, we cannot expect that the defining tropes of patent enactment can be
avoided, but Butler’s analysis suggests that they can be subverted. Performative
constraints may be repurposed to mark out a space for greater diversity. We see
indications in recent scholarship of how patents might be “queered” in this
fashion. Some commentators have begun to question the assumption that the
promotion of technical progress is always beneficial.217 Others have challenged
the notion of “progress” itself, asking whether innovation may be defined
differently than the extractive purposes of current patent policy.218 In the
copyright context, Severine Dusollier has similarly argued that intellectual
property should be re-imagined as a set of inclusive, rather than exclusive
rights.219 Geertrui van Overwalle has explicitly attempted to operationalize such
inclusive rights for the patent system, outlining a system for inclusive, rather than
exclusive patents.220 Such glimmers of resistance to the existing enactment of
patents indicate the potential for defining more inclusive performances of
inventorship and innovation.

Butler, supra note 53, at 24.
See, e.g., Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Innovation Institutions and the Opioid
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219 Severine Dusollier, Inclusivity in Intellectual Property, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
GENERAL LEGAL PRINCIPLES – IS IP A LEX SPECIALIS? 101 (Graeme Dinwoodie ed., 2015).
220 Geertrui Van Overwalle, Inventing Inclusive Patents: From Old to New Open Innovation, in 1
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